Chinese Translation of Saints and Scamps: Ethics in Academia by Dr. Steven Cahn
Various logical notions of know-how have been recently proposed and studied in the literature based on different types of epistemic planning in different frameworks. This paper proposes a unified logical framework to incorporate the existing and some new notions of know-how. We define the semantics of the know-how operator using a unified notion of epistemic planning with parameters of different types of plans specified by a programming language. Surprisingly, via a highly unified completeness proof, we show that all the ten intuitive notions of plans discussed in this paper lead to exactly the same know-how logic, which is proven to be decidable. We also show that over finite models, the know-how logic based on knowledge-based plans requires an extension with an axiom capturing the compositionality of the plans. In the context of epistemic planning, our axiomatization results reveal the core principles behind the very idea of epistemic planning, independent of the particular notion of plans. Moreover, since epistemic planning can be expressed by the know-how modality in our object language, we can greatly generalize the planning problems that can be solved formally by model checking various formulas in our know-how language.
In this paper, we give an alternative semantics to the non-normal logic of knowing how proposed by Fervari et al. (2017), based on a class of Kripke neighbor-hood models with both the epistemic relations and neighborhood structures. This alternative semantics is inspired by the same quantifier alternation pattern of ∃∀in the semantics of the know-how modality and the (monotonic) neighborhood semantics for the standard modality. We show that this new semantics is equivalent to the original Kripke semantics in terms of the validities. A key result is a representation theorem showing that the more abstract Kripke neighborhood models can be represented by the concrete Kripke models with action transitions modulo the valid formulas. We prove the completeness of the logic for the neighborhood semantics. The neighborhood semantics can be adapted to other variants of logics of knowing how. It provides us a powerful technical tool to study these logics while preserving the basic semantic intuition.
Weakly Aggregative Modal Logic (WAML) is a collection of disguised polyadic modal logics with -ary modalities whose arguments are all the same. WAML has some interesting applications on epistemic logic, deontic logic, and the logic of belief, and in this paper, we study some basic model theoretical aspects of WAML. Specifically, we first give a van Benthem-Rosen characterization theorem of WAML based on an intuitive notion of bisimulation. Then, in contrast to many well known normal or non-normal modal logics, we show that each basic WAML system lacks Craig interpolation. Finally, by model theoretical techniques, we show that an extension of does have Craig interpolation, as an example of amending the interpolation problem of WAML.
(Extended journal version of the LORI19 conference paper)
Various planning-based know-how logics have been proposed and studied in the recent literature. In this paper, we use such a logic to do know-how-based planning via model checking. In particular, we can handle the higher-order epistemic planning involving know-how formulas as the goal, e.g., find a plan to make sure p such that the adversary does not know how to make p false afterward. We give a PTIME-algorithm for the model checking problem over finite epistemic transition systems and axiomatize the logic under the assumption of perfect recall.
Abstract. This paper connects the following three apparently unrelated topics: an epistemic framework fighting logical omniscience, a class of generalized graphs without the arities of relations, and a family of nonnormal modal logic rejecting the aggregative axiom. Through neighborhood frames as their meeting point, we show that, among many completeness results obtained in this paper, the limit of a family of weakly aggregative logics is both exactly the modal logic of hypergraphs and also the epistemic logic of local reasoning with veracity and positive introspection, which also answers a question left open by Fagin and Halpern (1988). The logics studied are shown to be decidable based on a filtration construction.
In this paper, we propose a lightweight yet powerful dynamic epistemic logic that not only captures the distinction between de dicto and de re knowledge but also the distinction between de dicto and de re updates. The logic is based on the dynamified version of an epistemic language extended with the assignment operator borrowed from dynamic logic, following the work of Wang and Seligman (2018). We obtain complete axiomatizations for the counterparts of public announcement logic and event-model-based DEL based on new reduction axioms taking care of the interactions between dynamics and assignments.
As a new type of epistemic logic, the logic of knowing how essentially captures the high-level epistemic reasoning about the knowledge of various plans to achieve certain goals. Existing work focuses on the axiomatizations of such logics. This paper makes the first study of their model theoretical properties, by introducing suitable notions of bisimulation for a family of five logics of knowing how based on various notions of plans. As an application of these notions of bisimulation, we study and compare the expressive power of these logics.
(A preliminary version of this paper was first presented at SR2017.)
Abstract. When we say “I know why he was late”, we know not only the fact that he was late, but also an explanation of this fact. We propose a logical framework of “knowing why” inspired by the existing formal studies on why-questions, scientific explanation, and justification logic. We introduce the $Ky_i$ operator into the language of epistemic logic to express “agent i knows why phi” and propose a Kripke-style semantics of such expressions in terms of knowing an explanation of phi. We obtain two sound and complete axiomatizations w.r.t. two different model classes depending on different assumptions about introspection.
Abstract. Weakly Aggregative Modal Logic (WAML) is a collection of disguised polyadic modal logics with n-ary modalities whose arguments are all the same. WAML has some interesting applications on epistemic logic and logic of games, so we study some basic model theoretical aspects of WAML in this paper. Specically, we give a van Benthem-Rosen characterization theorem of WAML based on an intuitive notion of bisimulation and show that each basic WAML system Kn lacks Craig Interpolation.
Abstract. There are currently two approaches to the logic of knowing how: the planning-based one and the coalition-based one. However, the rst is single-agent, and the second is based on single-step joint actions. In this paper, to overcome both limitations, we propose a multi-agent framework for the logic of knowing how, based on multi-step dynamic epistemic planning studied in the literature. We obtain a sound and com- plete axiomatization and show that the logic is decidable, although the corresponding multi-agent epistemic planning problem is undecidable.
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a logical framework extending the standard epistemic logic with a new knowledge operator $\G_i$ which captures the knowledge about (physically) necessary facts, e.g., scientific knowledge. Semantically, the truth of $\G_i\phi$ depends on not only the epistemically indistinguishable worlds from the current real world but also the relevant (physically) possible worlds which are clearly distinguishable. Essentially, $\G_i$ is a bundle of the standard epistemic modality and a necessity-like modality. We axiomatize the corresponding epistemic logic completely in single- and multi-agent cases with interesting interaction axioms between the two epistemic operators.
Abstract. In standard epistemic logic, knowing that p is the same as knowing that p is true, but it does not say anything about understanding p or knowing its meaning. In this paper, we present a conservative extension of Public Announcement Logic (PAL) in which agents have knowledge or belief about both the truth values and the meanings of propositions. We give a complete axiomatization of PAL with Boolean Definitions and discuss various examples. An agent may understand a proposition without knowing its truth value or the other way round. Moreover, multiple agents can agree on something without agreeing on its meaning and vice versa.
Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a probabilistic dynamic epistemic logical framework that can be applied for reasoning and verifying conformant probabilistic plans in a single agent setting. In conformant probabilistic planning (CPP), we are looking for a linear plan such that the probability of achieving the goal after executing the plan is no less than a given threshold probability $\delta$. Our logical framework can trace the change of the belief state of the agent during the execution of the plan and verify the conformant plans. Moreover, with this logic, we can enrich the CPP framework by formulating the goal as a formula in our language with action modalities and probabilistic beliefs. As for the main technical results, we provide a complete axiomatization of the logic and show the decidability of its validity problem.
Abstract: In standard epistemic logic, agent names are usually assumed to be common knowledge implicitly. This is unreasonable for various applications. Inspired by term modal logic and assignment operators in dynamic logic, we introduce a lightweight modal predicate logic where names can be non-rigid. The language can handle various de dicto and de re distinctions in a natural way. The main technical result is a complete axiomatisation of this logic over S5 models.
Abstract: A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula (that is false and) that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy’s logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically defined categories, on iterated announcements, including arbitrarily often iterated announcements, and on syntactic characterization. We close with results for iterated announcements in the logic of knowledge (instead of belief), and for lying as private announcements (instead of public announcements) to different agents. Detailed examples illustrate our lying concepts.
Abstract: Quantified modal logic provides a natural logical language for reasoning about modal attitudes even while retaining the richness of quantification for referring to predicates over domains. But then most fragments of the logic are undecidable, over many model classes. Over the years, only a few fragments (such as the monodic) have been shown to be decidable. In this paper, we study fragments that bundle quantifiers and modalities together, inspired by earlier work on epistemic logics of know-how/why/what. As always with quantified modal logics, it makes a significant difference whether the domain stays the same across worlds, or not. In particular, we show that the bundle is undecidable over constant domain interpretations, even with only monadic predicates, whereas bundle is decidable. On the other hand, over increasing domain interpretations, we get decidability with both and bundles with unrestricted predicates. In these cases, we also obtain tableau based procedures that run in PSPACE. We further show that the bundle cannot distinguish between constant domain and increasing domain interpretations.
Abstract. Epistemic logic has become a major field of philosophical logic ever since the groundbreaking work by Hintikka (1962). Despite its various successful applications in theoretical computer science, AI, and game theory, the technical development of the field has been mainly focusing on the propositional part, i.e., the propositional modal logics of “knowing that”. However, knowledge is expressed in everyday life by using various other locutions such as “knowing whether”, “knowing what”, “knowing how” and so on (knowing-wh hereafter). Such knowledge expressions are better captured in quantified epistemic logic, as was already discussed by Hintikka (1962) and his sequel works at length. This paper aims to draw the attention back again to such a fascinating but largely neglected topic. We first survey what Hintikka and others did in the literature of quantified epistemic logic, and then advocate a new quantifier-free approach to study the epistemic logics of knowing-wh, which we believe can balance expressivity and complexity, and capture the essential reasoning patterns about knowing-wh. We survey our recent line of work on the epistemic logics of “knowing whether”, “knowing what” and “knowing how” to demonstrate the use of this new approach.
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a decidable single-agent modal logic for reasoning about goal-directed “knowing how”, based on ideas from linguistics, philosophy, modal logic, and automated planning in AI. We first define a modal language to express “I know how to guarantee (Formula presented.) given (Formula presented.)” with a semantics based not on standard epistemic models but on labeled transition systems that represent the agent’s knowledge of his own abilities. The semantics is inspired by conformant planning in AI. A sound and complete proof system is given to capture valid reasoning patterns, which highlights the compositional nature of “knowing how”. The logical language is further extended to handle knowing how to achieve a goal while maintaining other conditions.
(This is an extended journal version of the LORI2015 paper)
Abstract. In this paper, we propose a single-agent logic of goal-directed knowing how extending the standard epistemic logic of knowing that with a new knowing how operator. The semantics of the new operator is based on the idea that knowing how to achieve means that there exists a (uniform) strategy such that the agent knows that it can make sure . We give an intuitive axiomatization of our logic and prove the soundness, completeness, and decidability of the logic. The crucial axioms relating knowing that and knowing how illustrate our understanding of knowing how in this setting. This logic can be used in representing both knowledge-that and knowledge-how.
Abstract: In this article, we introduce a lightweight dynamic epistemic logical framework for automated planning under initial uncertainty. We generalize the standard conformant planning problem in AI (over transition systems) in two crucial aspects: first, the planning goal can be any formula expressed in an epistemic propositional dynamic logic (EPDL); second, procedural constraints of the desired plan specified by regular expressions can be imposed. We then reduce the problem of generalized conformant planning to the model checking problem of our logic. Although our conformant planning problem is much more general than the standard one with Boolean goals and no procedural constraints, the complexity is still PSPACE-complete which is equally hard as standard conformant planning over explicit transition systems.
Abstract: We present a basic dynamic epistemic logic of “knowing the value”. Analogous to public announcement in standard DEL, we study “public inspection”, a new dynamic operator which updates the agents’ knowledge about the values of constants.We provide a sound and strongly complete axiomatization for the single and multi-agent case, making use of the well-known Armstrong axioms for dependencies in databases.
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a ternary knowing how operator to express that the agent knows how to achieve $\phi$ given $\psi$ while maintaining $\chi$ in-between. It generalizes the logic of goal-directed knowing how proposed by Wang in . We give a sound and complete axiomatization of this logic.
Abstract: Recent years witnessed a growing interest in non-standard epistemic logics of knowing whether, knowing how, knowing what, knowing why and so on. The new epistemic modalities introduced in those logics all share, in their semantics, the general schema of , e.g., knowing how to achieve roughly means that there exists a way such that you know that it is a way to ensure that Moreover, the resulting logics are decidable. Inspired by those particular logics, in this work, we propose a very general and powerful framework based on quantifier-free predicate language extended by a new modality x, which packs exactly x together. We show that the resulting language, though much more expressive, shares many good properties of the basic propositional modal logic over arbitrary models, such as finite-tree-model property and van Benthem-like characterization w.r.t. first-order modal logic. We axiomatize the logic over S5 frames with intuitive axioms to capture the interaction between x and know-that operator in an epistemic setting.
Abstract：In this article, we present an attempt to reconcile intellectualism and the anti-intellectualist ability account of knowledge-how by reducing “S knows how to F” to, roughly speaking, “S knows that she has the ability to F demonstrated by a concrete way w.” More precisely, “S has a certain ability” is further formalized as the proposition that S can guarantee a certain goal by a concrete way w of some method under some precondition. Having the knowledge of our own ability, we can plan our future actions accordingly, which would not be possible by merely having the ability without knowing it, and this pinpoints the crucial difference between knowledge-how and ability. Our semi-formal account avoids most of the objections to both intellectualism and the anti-intellectualist ability account and provides a multistage learning process of knowledge-how, which reveals various subtleties.
Abstract. Recent years witness a growing interest in nonstandard epistemic logics of “knowing whether”, “knowing what”, “knowing how”, and so on. These logics are usually not normal, i.e., the standard axioms and reasoning rules for modal logic may be invalid. In this paper, we show that the conditional “knowing value” logic proposed by Wang and Fan (2013) can be viewed as a disguised normal modal logic by treating the negation of the Kv operator as a special diamond. Under this perspective, it turns out that the original first-order Kripke semantics can be greatly simplified by introducing a ternary relation in standard Kripke models, which associates one world with two i-accessible worlds that do not agree on the value of constant c. Under intuitive constraints, the modal logic based on such Kripke models is exactly the one studied by Wang and Fan (2013,2014). Moreover, there is a very natural binary generalization of the “knowing value” diamond, which, surprisingly, does not increase the expressive power of the logic. The resulting logic with the binary diamond has a transparent normal modal system, which sharpens our understanding of the “knowing value” logic and simplifies some previously hard problems.
Abstract. When reasoning about knowledge of procedures under imperfect information, the explicit representation of epistemic possibilities blows up the S5-like models of standard epistemic logic. To overcome this drawback, in this paper, we propose a new logical framework based on compact models without epistemic accessibility relations for reasoning about knowledge of procedures. Inspired by the 3-valued abstraction method in model checking, we introduce hyper models which encode the imperfect procedural information. We give a highly non-trivial 2-valued semantics of epistemic dynamic logic on such models while validating all the usual S5 axioms. Our approach is suitable for applications where procedural information is ‘learned’ incrementally, as demonstrated by various examples.
Abstract: In the literature of game theory, the information sets of extensive form games have different interpretations, which may lead to confusions and paradoxical cases. We argue that the problem lies in the mix-up of two interpretations of the extensive form game structures: game rules or game runs which do not always coincide. In this paper, we try to separate and connect these two views by proposing a dynamic epistemic framework in which we can compute the runs step by step from the game rules plus the given assumptions of the players. We propose a modal logic to describe players’ knowledge and its change during the plays, and provide a complete axiomatization. We also show that, under certain conditions, the mix-up of the rules and the runs is not harmful due to the structural similarity of the two.
Abstract. In this paper, we introduce and formalize the concept of epistemic informativeness (EI) of statements: the set of new propositions that an agent comes to know from the truthful announcement of the statements. We formalize EI in multi-agent Public Announcement Logic and characterize it by proving that two basic statements are the same in EI iff the logical equivalence of the two is common knowledge after a certain announcement. As a corollary applied to identity statements, and are different in EI iff is not common knowledge. This may shed new light on the differences in cognitive value of and , even when they are both known to be true, as long as is not commonly known to all.
Abstract: A proposition is noncontingent, if it is necessarily true or it is necessarily false. In an epistemic context, ‘a proposition is noncontingent’ means that you know whether the proposition is true. In this paper, we study contingency logic with the noncontingency operator ? but without the necessity operator 2. This logic is not a normal modal logic, because is not valid. Contingency logic cannot define many usual frame properties, and its expressive power is weaker than that of basic modal logic over classes of models without reflexivity. These features make axiomatizing contingency logics nontrivial, especially for the axiomatization over symmetric frames. In this paper, we axiomatize contingency logics over various frame classes using a novel method other than the methods provided in the literature, based on the ‘almost-definability’ schema AD proposed in our previous work. We also present extensions of contingency logic with dynamic operators. Finally, we compare our work to the related work in the fields of contingency logic and ignorance logic, where the two research communities have similar results but are apparently unaware of each other’s work. One goal of our paper is to bridge this gap.
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a single-agent modal logic framework for reasoning about goal-direct “knowing how” based on ideas from linguistics, philosophy, modal logic and automated planning. We first define a modal language to express “I know how to guarantee phi given $\psi$” with a semantics not based on standard epistemic models but labelled transition systems that represent the agent’s knowledge of his own abilities. A sound and complete proof system is given to capture the valid reasoning patterns about “knowing how” where the most important axiom suggests its compositional nature.
Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a lightweight dynamic epistemic logical framework for automated plan-ning under initial uncertainty. We reduce plan verification and conformant planning to model check-ing problems of our logic. We show that the model checking problem of the iteration-free fragment is PSPACE-complete. By using two non-standard (but equivalent) semantics, we give novel model checking algorithms to the full language and the iteration-free language.
Abstract. When agents know a protocol, this leads them to have expectations about future observations. Agents can update their knowledge by matching their actual observations with the expected ones. They eliminate states where they do not match. In this paper, we study how agents perceive protocols that are not commonly known, and propose a semantics-driven logical framework to reason about knowledge in such scenarios. In particular, we introduce the notion of epistemic expectation models and a propositional dynamic logic-style epistemic logic for reasoning about knowledge via matching agents’ expectations to their observations. It is shown how epistemic expectation models can be obtained from epistemic protocols. Furthermore, a characterization is presented of the effective equivalence of epistemic protocols. We introduce a new logic that incorporates updates of protocols and that can model reasoning about knowledge and observations. Finally, the framework is extended to incorporate fact-changing actions, and a worked-out example is given.
(Extended journal version of the TARK2011 paper)
Abstract. Classic epistemic logic focuses on propositional knowledge expressed by “knowing that” operators. However, there are various types of knowledge used in natural language, in terms of “knowing how”, “knowing whether”, “knowing what”, and so on. In , Plaza proposed an intuitive know-what operator which was generalized in  by introducing a condition. The latter know-what operator can express natural conditional knowledge such as $\backslash$I know what your password is, if it is 4-digits”, which is not simply a material implication. Essentially this know-what operator packages a first-order quantifier and an S5-modality together in a non-trivial way, thus making it hard to axiomatize. In  an axiomatization is given for the single-agent epistemic logic with both know-that and know-what operators, while leaving axiomatizing the multi-agent case open due to various technical difficulties. In this paper, we solve this open problem. The completeness proof is highly non-trivial, compared to the singleagent case, which requires different techniques inspired by first-order intensional logic.
Abstract. An extensive review of Johan van Benthem’s book Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction
Abstract. A formula is contingent if it is possibly true and possibly false. A formula is non- contingent if it is not contingent, i.e., if it is necessarily true or necessarily false. In an epistemic setting, a formula is contingent’ means that you are ignorant about its value, whereas a formula is non-contingent’ means that you know whether it is true. Although non-contingency is definable in terms of necessity as above, necessity is not always definable in terms of non-contingency, as studied in the literature. We propose an almost-definability’ schema AD for non-contingency logic, the logic with the noncontingency operator as the only modality, making precise when necessity is definable with non-contingency. Based on AD we propose a notion of bisimulation for non- contingency logic, and characterize non-contingency logic as the (non-contingency) bisimulation invariant fragment of modal logic and of first-order logic. A known pain for non-contingency logic is the absence of axioms characterizing frame properties. This makes it harder to find axiomatizations of non-contingency logic over given frame classes. In particular, no axiomatization over symmetric frames is known, despite the rich results about non-contingency logic obtained in the literature since the 1960s. We demonstrate that the almost-definability’ schema AD can guide our search for proper axioms for certain frame properties, and help us in defining the canonical models. Following this idea, as the main result, we give a complete axiomatization of non-contingency logic over symmetric frames.
Abstract. In this paper, we first propose a simple formal language to specify types of agents in terms of necessary conditions for their announcements. Based on this language, types of agents are treated as ‘first-class citizens’ and studied extensively in various dynamic epistemic frameworks which are suitable for reasoning about knowledge and agent types via announcements and questions. To demonstrate our approach, we discuss various versions of Smullyan’s Knights and Knaves puzzles, including the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE) proposed by Boolos (in Harv Rev Philos 6:62-65, 1996). In particular, we formalize HLPE and verify a classic solution to it. Moreover, we propose a spectrum of new puzzles based on HLPE by considering subjective (knowledge-based) agent types and relaxing the implicit epistemic assumptions in the original puzzle. The new puzzles are harder than the previously proposed ones in the literature, in the sense that they require deeper epistemic reasoning. Surprisingly, we also show that a version of HLPE in which the agents do not know the others’ types does not have a solution at all. Our formalism paves the way for studying these new puzzles using automatic model checking techniques.
Abstract. In the literature, different axiomatizations of Public Announcement Logic (PAL) have been proposed. Most of these axiomatizations share a “core set” of the so-called “reduction axioms”. In this paper, by designing non-standard Kripke semantics for the language of PAL, we show that the proof system based on this core set of axioms does not completely axiomatize PAL without additional axioms and rules. In fact, many of the intuitive axioms and rules we took for granted could not be derived from the core set. Moreover, we also propose and advocate an alternative yet meaningful axiomatization of PAL without the reduction axioms. The completeness is proved directly by a detour method using the canonical model where announcements are treated as merely labels for modalities as in normal modal logics. This new axiomatization and its completeness proof may sharpen our understanding of PAL and can be adapted to other dynamic epistemic logics.
(largely extended journal version of the LORI2011 paper)
Abstract. In everyday life, people get lost even when they have the map: they simply may not know where they are in the map. However, when moving forward they may have new observations which can help to locate themselves by reasoning. In this paper, we propose and develop a semantic-driven dynamic epistemic framework to handle epistemic reasoning in such navigation scenarios. Our framework can be viewed as a careful blend of dynamic epistemic logic and epistemic temporal logic, thus enjoying features from both frameworks. We made an in-depth study on many model theoretical aspects of the proposed framework and provide a complete axiomatization.
Abstract. In social interactions, protocols govern our behavior and assign meaning to actions. In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of protocols and their epistemic effects. We develop two logics, inspired by Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) and Public Announcement Logic (PAL), for reasoning about protocol change and knowledge updates. We show that these two logics can be translated back to the standard PDL and PAL respectively.
Abstract. In the literature, different axiomatizations of Public Announcement Logic (PAL) were proposed. Most of these axiomatizations share a ‘core set’ of the so-called reduction axioms. In particular, there is a composition axiom which stipulates how two consecutive announcements are composed into one. In this paper, by designing non-standard Kripke semantics for the language of PAL, we show that without the composition axiom the core set does not completely axiomatize PAL. In fact, most of the intuitive ‘axioms’ and rules we took for granted could not be derived from the core set. The non-standard semantics we proposed is of its own interest in modelling realistic agents. We show that with the help of different composition axioms we may axiomatize PAL w.r.t. such non-standard semantics.
Abstract. In this paper, we develop an epistemic logic for specifying and reasoning about information flow on the underlying communication channels. By combining ideas from Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) and Interpreted Systems (IS), our semantics offers a natural and neat way of modeling multi-agent communication scenarios with different assumptions about the observational power of agents. We relate our logic to the standard DEL and IS approaches and demonstrate its use by studying a telephone call communication scenario.
Abstract appeared at AAMAS2010
When agents know a protocol, this leads them to have expectations about future observations. Agents can update their knowledge by matching their actual observations with the expected ones. They eliminate states where they do not match. In this paper, we study how agents perceive protocols that are not commonly known, and propose a logic to reason about knowledge in such scenarios.
Abstract. We propose and study a new composition operation on (epistemic) multi-agent models with different vocabularies of propositional letters. This operation allows us to compose large models by small components representing agents’ partial observational information. Our investigation provides ways to decompose (locally generated) epistemic models such that the truth of certain formulas are preserved. By using the composition operation we also propose and study action model composition and action model updates on models with arbitrary vocabularies.
Abstract. Security properties naturally combine temporal aspects of protocols with aspects of knowledge of the agents. Since BAN-logic, there have been several initiatives and attempts to incorporate epistemics into the analysis of security protocols. In this paper, we give an overview of work in the field and present it in a unified perspective, with comparisons on technical subtleties that have been employed in different approaches. Also, we study to which degree the use of epistemics is essential for the analysis of security protocols. We look for formal conditions under which knowledge modalities can bring extra expressive power to pure temporal languages. On the other hand, we discuss the cost of the epistemic operators in terms of model checking complexity.
Abstract. Epistemic protocols are communication protocols aiming at transfer of knowledge in a controlled way. Typically, the preconditions or goals for protocol actions depend on the knowledge of agents, often in nested form. Informal epistemic protocol descriptions for muddy children, coordinated attack, dining cryptographers, Russian cards, secret key exchange are well known. The contribution of this paper is a formal study of a natural requirement on epistemic protocols, that the contents of the protocol can be assumed to be common knowledge. By formalizing this requirement we can prove that there can be no unbiased deterministic protocol for the Russian cards problem. For purposes of our formal analysis we introduce an epistemic protocol language, and we show that its model checking problem is decidable.
Abstract. We propose a property-preserving refinement/abstraction theory for Kripke Modal Labelled Transition Systems incorporating not only state mapping but also label and proposition lumping, in order to have a compact but informative abstraction. We develop a 3-valued version of Public Announcement Logic (PAL) which has a dynamic operator that changes the model in the spirit of public broadcasting. We prove that the refinement relation on static models assures us to safely reason about any dynamic properties in terms of PAL-formulas on the abstraction of a model. The theory is in particular interesting and applicable for an epistemic setting as the example of the Muddy Children puzzle shows, especially in the view of the growing interest for epistemic modelling and (automatic) verification of communication protocols.
Abstract. We present a thorough study of Propositional Dynamic Logic over a variation of labeled transition systems, called accelerated labelled transition systems, which are transition systems labeled with regular expressions over action labels. We study the model checking and satisfiability decision problems. Through a notion of regular expression rewriting, we reduce these two problems to the corresponding ones of PDL in the traditional semantics (w.r.t. LTS). As for the complexity, both of problems are proved to be EXPSPACE-complete. Moreover, the program, complexity of model checking problem turns out to be Nlogspace-complete. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatization for PDL which involves Kleene Algebra as an Oracle. The soundness and completeness are shown.