



EPISTEMIC LOGIC V

DYNAMIC EPISTEMIC LOGIC (A)

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Dynamic Epistemic Logic: background

Public Announcement Logic

Two basic questions to be answered

DYNAMIC EPISTEMIC LOGIC: BACK- GROUND

HANDLING KNOWLEDGE CHANGES

Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL) and *Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL)*

	language	model	semantics
ETL	time+K	temporal+epistemic	Kripke-like
DEL	K+events	epistemic	Kripke+ <i>dynamic</i>

$$\neg Kp \wedge [e] Kp$$



$$\neg Kp \wedge [!p] Kp$$



DEL handles *how* is the knowledge updated.

[Stalnaker, 1978] on *assertion*:

- Its content is *dependent* on its context.
- It *modifies* the context.

The ideas of discourse representation theory, dynamic logic and the above points together inspired the invention of *dynamic semantics* [Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991] and *update semantics* [Veltman, 1996]:

The meaning of a sentence is identified with its *context change potential*.


(Compare it with truth conditional semantics: knowing the meaning of a sentence is knowing when it is true)

One step further:

The meaning of a communicative event is the *change* it brings to the epistemic states of the participants in the discourse.

- [Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997] combined the ideas of [Veltman, 1996] and [Fagin et al., 1995]: dynamic epistemic semantics for announcements.
- [Gerbrandy, 1999] developed the idea further. Some ILLC students rediscovered [Plaza, 1989] in which the public announcement logic (PAL) was proposed and studied in depth.
- [Baltag et al., 1998] proposed the dynamic epistemic logic with action model updates.

From Web of Science database:



Overview books:

- Dynamic Epistemic Logic [van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]
- Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction [van Benthem, 2011]

From Springer Link

Computer Science	384
Philosophy	280
Mathematics	145
Education & Language	81
Economics	30
Social Sciences	22

Do we really understand thoroughly what we are doing? What is *Dynamic Epistemic Logic* as a field?

In searching for the answer, let us go back to the basics.

We will focus on axiomatizations:

- It helps us to understand the semantics-driven logics better.
- It helps to compare with related approaches.

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT LOGIC

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT LOGIC (PAL)

The language of *Public Announcement Logic* (PAL):

$$\phi ::= p \mid \neg\phi \mid (\phi \wedge \phi) \mid K_i\phi \mid [\phi]\phi \text{ (also write } [!\phi]\phi)$$

We define $\langle\psi\rangle\phi$ as $\neg[\psi]\neg\phi$.

It is interpreted on (S5) Kripke models $\mathcal{M} = (S, \{\rightarrow_i\}_{i \in I}, V)$:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} \mathcal{M}, s \models K_i\psi \iff \forall t : s \rightarrow_i t \implies \mathcal{M}, t \models \psi \\ \mathcal{M}, s \models [\psi]\phi \iff \mathcal{M}, s \models \psi \text{ implies } \mathcal{M}|_{\psi}, s \models \phi \end{array}}$$

where $\mathcal{M}|_{\psi} = (S', \{\rightarrow'_i \mid i \in I\}, V')$ such that: $S' = \{s \mid \mathcal{M}, s \models \psi\}$, $\rightarrow'_i = \rightarrow_i \upharpoonright_{S' \times S'}$ and $V'(p) = V(p) \cap S'$.


$$\begin{array}{ccc} \begin{array}{c} \curvearrowright \\ s_1 : \{p\} \end{array} & \leftarrow 1 \rightarrow & \begin{array}{c} \curvearrowright \\ s_2 : \{\} \end{array} & [p] \implies & \begin{array}{c} \curvearrowright \\ s_1 : \{p\} \end{array} \end{array}$$

$$\mathcal{M}, s_1 \models \neg K_1 p \wedge [p] K_1 p$$

THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE: MUDDY CHILDREN


- Out of n children, $k \geq 1$ got mud on their faces while playing.
- They can see whether other kids are dirty, but there is no mirror for them to discover whether they are dirty themselves.
- Then father walks in and states: “At least one of you is dirty!” Then he requests “If you know you are dirty, step forward now.”
- If nobody steps forward, he repeats his request: “If you now know you are dirty, step forward now.”
- After exactly k requests to step forward, the k dirty children suddenly do so (assuming they are honest and perfect reasoners).

WHEN THERE ARE 3 DIRTY CHILDREN...



“At least one of you is dirty!”

Announcement: $\psi = D_1 \vee D_2 \vee D_3$



The classic modal logic questions:

- Do we have a complete axiomatization?
- Do we have complete axiomatizations w.r.t. certain classes of frames ?
- Do the axioms and rules of a normal modality also hold for $[\psi]$?
- Is **PAL** invariant under bisimulation or other equivalence notions?
- Does it have finite model property?
- Is it decidable?
- How is its definability over models and frames?
- What is the relationship between **PAL** and modal (epistemic) logic?
- Is it translatable into first-order logic?

GET FAMILIAR WITH IT FIRST!

Try to get a feeling of the semantics of **PAL** by checking the validity of the following formula schemas and rules.

- $\langle \phi \rangle \psi \rightarrow [\phi] \psi$, $\langle \phi \rangle \psi \rightarrow \phi$, $\langle \phi \rangle \psi \leftrightarrow (\phi \wedge [\phi] \psi)$
- $[\psi](\phi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ([\psi] \phi \rightarrow [\psi] \chi)$, $[\psi](\phi \rightarrow \chi) \leftrightarrow ([\psi] \phi \rightarrow [\psi] \chi)$
- $[\psi] p \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow p)$, $[\psi] \neg \phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \neg \phi)$ (✗), $[\psi] \neg \phi \leftrightarrow \neg [\psi] \phi$ (✗), $[\psi] \neg \phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \neg [\psi] \phi)$
- $\frac{\phi}{[\psi] \phi}$, $\frac{\phi(p)}{\phi(\psi)}$ (✗), $\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \psi}{[\phi] \chi \leftrightarrow [\psi] \chi}$, $\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \psi}{[\chi] \phi \leftrightarrow [\chi] \psi}$
- $[\psi] K_i \phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow K_i(\psi \rightarrow [\psi] \phi))$, $[\psi] K_i \phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow K_i[\psi] \phi)$
- $[\psi][\chi] \phi \leftrightarrow [\psi \wedge \chi] \phi$ (✗), $[\psi][\chi] \phi \leftrightarrow [\psi \wedge [\psi] \chi] \phi$
- $[\psi] K_i \psi$ (✗)

BASIC SYSTEM PA: AXIOMS AND RULES

Different proof systems were proposed in the literature which share the following axiom schemas and rules.

Axiom Schemas	
TAUT	all the instances of tautologies
DISTK	$K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi)$
!ATOM	$[\psi]\rho \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \rho)$
!NEG	$[\psi]\neg\phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \neg[\psi]\phi)$
!CON	$[\psi](\phi \wedge \chi) \leftrightarrow ([\psi]\phi \wedge [\psi]\chi)$
!K	$[\psi]K_i\phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow K_i[\psi]\phi)$
Rules	
NECK	$\frac{\phi}{K_i\phi}$
MP	$\frac{\phi, \phi \rightarrow \psi}{\psi}$

No uniform substitution!

AXIOMS AND RULES

Axiom Schemas	
DIST!	$[\psi](\phi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ([\psi]\phi \rightarrow [\psi]\chi)$
!COM	$[\psi][\chi]\phi \leftrightarrow [\psi \wedge [\psi]\chi]\phi$
Rules	
NEC!	$\frac{\phi}{[\psi]\phi}$
RE	$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \chi}{\psi \leftrightarrow \psi[\chi/\phi]}$

Axiom Schemas	
!ATOM	$[\psi]p \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow p)$
!NEG	$[\psi]\neg\phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \neg[\psi]\phi)$
!CON	$[\psi](\phi \wedge \chi) \leftrightarrow ([\psi]\phi \wedge [\psi]\chi)$
!K	$[\psi]K_i\phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow K_i[\psi]\phi)$

Semantic update as syntactic relativization:

$$\mathcal{M}|_{\psi}, s \vDash \phi \iff \mathcal{M}, s \vDash (\phi)^\psi$$

Proposition

All the above axiom schemas and rules are sound w.r.t the standard PAL semantics.

Theorem ([Plaza, 1989])

PAL is equally expressive as basic modal logic.

$$\begin{array}{llll}
 t(p) & = & p & t([\psi]p) & = & t(\psi \rightarrow p) \\
 t(\neg\phi) & = & \neg t(\phi) & t([\psi]\neg\phi) & = & t(\psi \rightarrow \neg[\psi]\phi) \\
 t(\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2) & = & t(\phi_1) \wedge t(\phi_2) & t([\psi](\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2)) & = & t([\psi]\phi_1 \wedge [\psi]\phi_2) \\
 t(K_i\phi) & = & K_i t(\phi) & t([\psi]K_i\phi) & = & t(\psi \rightarrow K_i[\psi]\phi) \\
 & & & t([\psi][\chi]\phi) & = & t([\psi]t([\chi]\phi))
 \end{array}$$

We can obtain another translation t' by revising t : just replace the last item by $t'([\psi][\chi]\phi) = t'([\psi] \wedge [\psi]\chi)\phi$

Intuitively, the translation “pushes” the $[\cdot]$ modality through the formula to the inner part. How to prove that the translation indeed produces $[\cdot]$ -free formulas?

Definition (Complexity of PAL formulas)

$$\begin{aligned}c(\top) &= 1 \\c(p) &= 1 \\c(\neg\phi) &= 1 + c(\phi) \\c(\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2) &= 1 + c(\phi_1) + c(\phi_2) \\c(K_i\phi) &= 1 + c(\phi) \\c([\psi]\phi) &= (5 + c(\psi)) \cdot c(\phi)\end{aligned}$$

We can show that:

$c(\phi) > c(\psi)$		If ψ is a proper subformula of ϕ
$c([\psi]\top)$	$>$	$c(\psi \rightarrow \top)$
$c([\psi]p)$	$>$	$c(\psi \rightarrow p)$
$c([\psi]\neg\phi)$	$>$	$c(\psi \rightarrow \neg[\psi]\phi)$
$c([\psi](\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2))$	$>$	$c([\psi]\phi_1 \wedge [\psi]\phi_2)$
$c([\psi]K_i\phi)$	$>$	$c(\psi \rightarrow K_i[\psi]\phi)$
$c([\psi][\chi]\phi)$	$>$	$c([\psi \wedge [\psi]\chi]\phi)$
$c([\psi][\chi]\phi)$	$>$	$c([\psi]t([\chi]\phi))$

We can prove by induction on the **complexity** of ϕ that (cf. DEL book Lemma 7.22, 7.23):

Proposition

$t(\phi)$ and $t'(\phi)$ are $[\cdot]$ -free.

We can show that:

Proposition

$\models \phi \leftrightarrow t(\phi)$ and $\models \phi \leftrightarrow t'(\phi)$

Is $t(\phi) = t'(\phi)$?

RECAP: PA + YOUR CHOICE

Axiom Schemas	
TAUT	all the instances of tautologies
DISTK	$K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi)$
!ATOM	$[\psi]p \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow p)$
!NEG	$[\psi]\neg\phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \neg[\psi]\phi)$
!CON	$[\psi](\phi \wedge \chi) \leftrightarrow ([\psi]\phi \wedge [\psi]\chi)$
!K	$[\psi]K_i\phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow K_i[\psi]\phi)$
Rules	
NECK	$\frac{\phi}{K_i\phi}$
MP	$\frac{\phi, \phi \rightarrow \psi}{\psi}$
Your choice	
RE	$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \chi}{\psi \leftrightarrow \psi[x/\phi]}$
!COM	$[\psi][x]\phi \leftrightarrow [\psi \wedge [\psi]x]\phi$

COMPLETENESS VIA REDUCTION

Completeness is proved via reduction and the completeness of basic modal logic **K**:

$\models \phi \implies \models t(\phi) \xrightarrow{\text{comp. of K}} \vdash_{\mathbf{K}} t(\phi) \implies \vdash_{\mathbf{PA}+} t(\phi) \xrightarrow{\text{Rd.Axioms}} \vdash_{\mathbf{PA}+} \phi$ We can mimic t and t' in proof systems stronger than **PA**.

Proposition

$\vdash_{\mathbf{PA}+\mathbf{RE}} \phi \leftrightarrow t(\phi)$ and $\vdash_{\mathbf{PA}+\mathbf{!COM}} \phi \leftrightarrow t'(\phi)$

Theorem ([Plaza, 1989])

*$\mathbf{PA}+\mathbf{RE}$ is complete w.r.t. the standard semantics of **PAL**.*

Theorem (cf. e.g., [van Ditmarsch et al., 2007])

*$\mathbf{PA}+\mathbf{!COM}$ is complete w.r.t. the standard semantics of **PAL**.*

Now we can answer most of the following questions:

- * Do we have a complete axiomatization?
- * Do we have complete axiomatizations w.r.t. other classes of frames?
- * Do the axioms and rules for K also hold for $[\psi]$?
- * Is PAL invariant under bisimulation?
- * Is it translatable into first-order logic?
- * Does it have finite model property?
- * Is it decidable?
- * How is its definability power (over models and frames)?
- *What if we add announcement operators on propositional logic?

Theorem ([Lutz, 2006])

PAL is exponentially more succinct than modal logic on arbitrary models.

$$\phi_0 = \top \text{ and } \phi_{i+1} = \langle\langle\phi_i\rangle\Diamond_1\top\rangle\Diamond_2\top.$$

Theorem ([French et al., 2011])

PAL is exponentially more succinct than modal logic on S5 models if there are more than 3 agents.

The reduction technique turns out to be extremely useful in many applications and thus dominates the field of DEL.

- Logic is more than it appears!
- Update-closeness may be considered as a desired property of a logic: it shows the logic has enough pre-encoding power [van Benthem et al., 2006].
- Compositional analysis of post-conditions.
- The orthodox programme of DEL:
static logic+dynamic operators+reduction
- Also good for lazy guys to have “results”...

TWO BASIC QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED

In some published papers, **PA** and its variants are mentioned as complete systems. Is **PA** really complete?

Unfortunately, **PA** and many of its “close friends” are **not** complete, and in some cases the flaws cannot be fixed.

Can we give meaningful axiomatizations without those reduction axioms and the reduction proof method?

Yes, we can!

We will give a general axiomatization method inspired by Epistemic Temporal Logic. It will tell us what exactly is assumed in **DEL**.

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