



# EPISTEMIC LOGIC

## II. A VERY BRIEF HISTORY

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Prehistory

Hintikka's foundational contributions

Early contributions by others

# PREHISTORY

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*Modal logic was discussed by several ancient authors, notably Aristotle, and also by mediaeval logicians; their work, however, lies outside the scope of this book.*

—Cresswell and Hughes: *A new introduction to modal logic*

- Chapters 3 and 8-22 of the first book of the *Prior Analytics*.
- “Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is almost incomprehensible because of its many faults and inconsistencies”.

–Łukasiewicz

- Many tried to make sense of it (even in formal systems)

Natural extension of the syllogistic language:

- Quantity: all, some
- Quality: affirmative (is), negative (not)
- *Modes*: null, necessary, possible, contingent
- 16 types of sentences

## ARISTOTLE'S MODAL SYLLOGISM

All A is B (AaB), No A is B (AeB), Some A is B (AiB), Some A is not B (AoB): e.g., Celarent, Darii, Ferio.

For example: Barbara LXL is considered valid by Aristotle:

- All B is necessarily A,
- All C is B,
- therefore: All C is necessarily A.

Barbara XLL is considered invalid by Aristotle:

- All B is A,
- All C is necessarily B,
- therefore: All C is necessarily A.

*De re vs. De dicto*

- Some A is necessarily B
- Necessarily some A is B

*ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things.*

–Aristotle *Metaphysics*

**Curiosity** drives the civilization further.

According to Boh 1993, there are four phases of Medieval Epistemic Logic:

- Special modes: to know, to believe, to doubt...
- Knowledge of necessary propositions
- Search for necessary and sufficient conditions of knowing *contingent* propositions
- Theory of logical rules

William of Ockham:

- necessary and contingent vs. known and unknown
- modal syllogism in other modes

For example:

- Socrates is known to be a man
- Socrates is white
- therefore: Some white thing is known to be a man
- *Not* to conclude: some man is known to be white

Pseudo-Scotus:

- nothing is known unless it is true
- if  $p$  and  $q$  jointly entail  $r$  then  $p$  is known and  $q$  is known jointly entail  $r$  too.
- but it does not entail  $r$  is known for:
  - $p$  and  $q$  may be known by different persons
  - $p \wedge q \rightarrow r$  is not known to the person

Many authors:

- knowing that  $p$  is not equivalent to knowing that  $p$  is true.
- knowledge entails strong belief (without hesitation and fear)

Peter of Mantua, Gaetaus:

- Strong true belief is not knowledge e.g. running Plato and Socrates
- Strong belief requires evidence for belief.

Strode:

- R13: From  $p \rightarrow q$  infer  $Kp \rightarrow Kq$
- R14: From  $p \rightarrow q$  and  $Dq$  infer  $Dp$  or  $K\neg p$
- R23: From  $p \rightarrow q$  infer  $Up \rightarrow Uq$ .
- adding the epistemic subjects

Paul of Pergula: conditions of the rules (e.g., R13)

- the consequence must be sound
- the consequence must be known:  $K(p \rightarrow q)$
- knowledge w.r.t. the same individual
- the subject must understand the proposition

Due to Boh 1993:

- $K_a(p \rightarrow q) \wedge K_ap \rightarrow K_aq$
- $K_ap \rightarrow T'p'$
- $K_ap \rightarrow p$
- $K_ap \rightarrow K_aK_ap$
- $B_ap \rightarrow B_aB_ap$
- $K_ap \rightarrow B_ap$
- $D_ap \leftrightarrow (\neg K_ap \wedge \neg K_a\neg p)$
- $K_ap \rightarrow p \wedge B_ap \wedge J_aB_ap$

- Ivan Boh (2000), Four Phases of Medieval Epistemic Logic. *Theoria*, 66: 129-144.
- Ivan Boh (1993): *Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages*, Routledge

# HINTIKKA'S FOUNDATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

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## HINTIKKA (1962)'S FOUNDATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

- motivation: logical consistency
- following von Wright's modal take on epistemic logic
- semantics for epistemic logic:
  - a single consistent set is not enough for epistemic possibility
  - knowing that  $p$  when  $\neg p$  is not an epistemic alternative
  - alternative relations are reflexive and transitive (for knowledge, S4), serial and transitive (for belief, KD4)
- from absolute agent-less knowledge to agent-dependent knowledge
- clarify or solve philosophy problems: e.g., Moore's paradox
- discussions on issues about the rules and axioms

Philosophers were not very happy about this *semantics* approach, and rules are doubtful: e.g., logical omniscience, moreover, it is not directly relevant to the JTB approach of

“knowing who” was discussed by Hintikka (1962) in terms of first-order modal logic:  $\exists xK(Mary \approx x)$ , i.e., knowing the answer of the embedded question.

Hintikka used epistemic logic to understand questions. E.g, consider the question  $Q$  : “Who murdered Mary?”

- The *presupposition* of  $Q$  is  $K\exists xM(x, Mary)$ .
- The *desideratum* of  $Q$  is  $\exists xKM(x, Mary)$  .
- One possible answer to  $Q$  is  $M(John, Mary)$ .
- *Conclusiveness* of the answer requires  $\exists xK(John \approx x)$ .
- Conclusive answers realize the desideratum ( $K\exists x$  to  $\exists xK$ ).

- This interest in the relationship between questions and knowledge also led Hintikka to the pursuit of a *Socratic epistemology* that weighs *knowledge acquisition* more importantly than *knowledge justification*.
- The attempt to avoid quantifying higher-order entities in formalizing sentences like “I know whom every young mother should trust” leads Hintikka to the core idea of *independent friendly logic* (from  $\exists f K \forall x (M(x) \rightarrow T(x, f(x)))$  to  $K \forall x (\exists y / K) (M(x) \rightarrow T(x, y))$ ).



FO distributive normal form, Hintikka sets, semantics for modal logic, epistemic logic, Game semantics, interrogative model of inquiry, IF logic Math, Logic, Philosophy, Linguistics, History...  
Be **Independent** and **Friendly**

## EARLY CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHERS

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## AUMANN (1976)'S EARLY CONTRIBUTIONS

- motivation: information in games
- Independent from the field of logic
- state space with partitions w.r.t. different players
- no logical language: an *event* is a subset of the space
- knowledge as an operator on events:  
$$K_i(E) = \{s \mid P_i(s) \subseteq E\}$$
- defining a notion of common knowledge which can be computed w.r.t. finite state space.
- use the notion to show it is not possible to “agree to disagree” given common prior (probabilistic distribution of the states).

Correspondence with epistemic (S5) models.

## MCCARTHY (1978)'S EARLY CONTRIBUTION

- motivation: *who knows what* is important in AI
- puzzle collector/maker: muddy children (unfaithful wives), sum and product, the hardest logic puzzle ever
- flexibility: useful logics instead of the 'correct one'
- “any fool knows” operator  $O$  (common knowledge)

Basic axioms (1978):

- $K_a p \rightarrow p$
- $O(K_a p \rightarrow p)$
- $O(Op \rightarrow OK_a p)$
- $O(K_a p \wedge K_a(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow K_a q)$
- optional:  $O(K_a p \rightarrow K_a K_a p)$
- optional:  $O(\neg K_a p \rightarrow K_a \neg K_a p)$

Timed epistemic logic for solving the unfaithful wives puzzle.

## PUZZLE: SUM AND PRODUCT (WIKI)

X and Y are two different natural numbers greater than 1. Their sum is not greater than 100, and Y is greater than X. S and P are two mathematicians (and consequently perfect logicians); S knows the sum  $X + Y$  and P knows the product  $X \times Y$ . Both S and P know all the information in this paragraph.

The following conversation occurs:

- S says "P does not know X and Y."
- P says "Now I know X and Y."
- S says "Now I also know X and Y."

What are X and Y?

Work by Xiwen Ma and Weide Guo.

## EARLY CONTRIBUTIONS BY HALPERN AND MOSES (1984, 1990)

- motivation: information in (communicating) distributed systems
- from agents to processors
- combination of time and knowledge
- constructive knowledge based on local states: interpreted systems
- show that certain coordination is not possible due to lack of common knowledge.

- Halpern's initiation
- Bi-annual conference series on theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge since 1986
- The 1986 conference brought computer scientists, philosopher, economists together: Aumann, Hintikka, McCarthy, Stalnaker, Halpern, Vardi, Moses, Fagin, Dwok, Smullyan, Moore, Asher, Kamp, Levesque, Immerman, Plotkin, Ladner, Fischer....
- Major interdisciplinary venue for epistemic /probabilistic reasoning in Philosophy, AI, CS, Economics, Linguistics ...
- <http://www.tark.org/>